In Re Sergio Garcia. What was the court thinking?

If you don't know, Sergio Garcia was an undocumented immigrant living in California.  Somehow he managed to obtain an education and a JD in the United States.  He was admitted to the state bar in 2014.  It is true that Sergio Garcia applied for permanent residence over twenty years ago and has not been processed yet.  A great debate needs to take place on federal immigration policy.  That, however is not the point of my anger against the California Supreme Court.  The  California Supreme Court misinterpreted a federal statute and encroached upon the supremacy of the federal government in an egregious way.  The federal government, being run by sympathizers of undocumented immigrants, did nothing to protect itself.  So far as I know, nobody is making my sort of argument, nor has made the argument in the past.  

The state misconstrued the federal statute (8 USC 1621(d)), which I contend means is, the only way a state may ever grant a benefit to an undocumented immigrant [under 8 USC 1621(b)] is by passing  a law affirmatively providing for such benefit after 8/22/1996.)   Even if the literal interpretation of 1621(d) comports with California's interpretation, then that interpretation would lead to absurd results and interfere with federal objectives. I will explain below.  

   
The California Supreme Court admitted Sergio Garcia to the bar because:: 

1.  The state assumed, that 8 USC 1621(a) would ordinarily bar Garcia's admission.
2.  Nonetheless, 8 USC 1621(d) allows states to grant any benefit to an undocumented immigrant, if it passes a law providing for such benefits after August 22, 1996. 

3. The state clearly passed such a law in 2013, well after 1996. 

4. No other state or federal law prohibits admitting an undocumented immigrant to the bar.

5. Sergio Garcia met all other requirements for admission.

The state's conclusion falls apart if premises 2 through 5 fail. Premise 2 fails, or, at the very least, proving the correctness of the state's interpretation of the statute required significantly more analysis than the supreme court provided in the opinion, choosing instead to leave the details to other cases, which also did not cover the matter in sufficient detail. 

The federal statute, 8 USC 1621 (d) reads:
" A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility."

1. "Only through" is not the same as "through." 

The state would have you believe that this statute says that a state can provide any benefit to an illegal immigrant if it passes a law so providing after 1996.  But, the words actually say ". . . a state may provide that an alien . . . is eligible . . . for  any [benefit] . . for which [he is] otherwise ineligible under subsection (a) . . .  only through [ enacting a law ] which affirmatively provides for such eligibility. "   

What the statute says is, a state may provide benefits ONLY BY passing a law.

In this context, A only through B, has the same meaning as A only if B.   Then, this reduces to an LSAT problem.

Well, then, logically speaking, A if B means if B, then A (B is a subset of A), but A only if B means  if A, then B (A is a subset of B). Here, A only if B is the construction used, and the A is (providing benefits) and B is (enacting a law after August 22, 1996). so, at best, the statute says, if a state provides any benefit to undocumented immigrants, then it passed a law after August 22, 1996.

The syllogism the state of California assumed without argument is, if a state passes a law . . . , it may provide benefits.  But that is absolutely the opposite syllogism that logically flows from the statute.

Imagine a person making any other A only if B statement,  Take for example, "A person may fly anywhere he wants, only if he is on an airplane."  May a person go anywhere he wants if he steps onto an airplane?  Not at all; myriad unstated premises must also be met.  (I can't go anywhere if I step onto the Air Force One plane which is parked at the Reagan Library). Likewise, stating, a state may give benefits to an undocumented immigrant only if it passes a law affirmatively providing for such does not mean passing a law automatically confers benefits.

Surprisingly, the State Senate policy statement on the bill that would become California Business and Professions Code 6064, which the Applicant cited in his supplemental brief as satisfying the federal statute, omitted the word, "only" in its quote of the federal statute, a key omission in my opinion, suggesting that the state senate saw precisely the problems in interpretation I am advancing, and purposely avoided discussing the issue.  I also have not seen any serious attempt to interpret the federal statute in any of the briefs filed with the state court.  Even Martinez, a prior opinion in which a benefit was allowed to inure to an undocumented immigrant, likewise made no serious attempt to interpret the federal statute. This prior opinion formed the basis for the Court;s reading of the federal law in this case.  

2. Subsection d of the federal statute does not state that it applies notwithstanding any other law.  it only says that states can provide benefits to illegal immigrants that would otherwise be impermissible under subsection a, and subsection a states the general rule that no illegal immigrant is eligible for any state or local public benefit. Then, it can only provide such benefits if it enacts a law that affirmatively provides for such benefits.  Likewise, the note at 1621 (a), "Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section . . . " does not explicitly state that b and d are separate exceptions to (a) and in fact, the words "(b) and (d)" suggest that subsections (b) and (d) were meant to operate in tandem, not separately.

3.  In fact, the argument that b and d are not separate exceptions is bolstered by the structure of 8 USC 1621, If (b) and (d) are independent exceptions to (a), then congress could have so indicated by clustering the subsections together instead of placing a definitions subsection between the two "exceptions" subsections. 

Piecing this evidence together, that the actual wording of (d) provides no substantive right to states, and the construction that if the state somehow manages to provide a benefit otherwise prohibited by 8 USC 1621(a) it must have passed an affirmative law, indicates that the proper construction of the statute is, "the only way for a state to invoke a subsection b exception to subsection a, is to affirmatively pass a law providing for a particular subsection b exception" for b is the only subsection which affirmatively provides for the state's right to grant a benefit to undocumented immigrants. If d were a new, substantive provision, why not call it subdivision c, and move the former subclause c to d? Congress could have done this but decided not to do it. If subdivisions d and c were added together to the same law, that further bolsters my position.

4. Even if the wording indicates a meaning different from my understanding, California's interpretation of 1621 (d) would lead to absurd results, because the federal government, then, would have allowed states to do that which subsection (a) prohibits by whim and simple majority vote, leaving the statute, 8 USC 1621, with little effect and preventing the federal government from ensuring that undocumented immigrants are self-sufficient, and removing incentives for immigration.

5. Also, the interpretation advanced by the state supreme court is preempted as interfering with federal objectives, under the supremacy clause of the constitution.  Because federal objectives are to ensure self-sufficiency among immigrants and to remove an incentive to immigrate (see 8 USC 1601), the state's providing for any public benefit to undocumented immigrants would thwart these objectives, Even if congress tried to permit states to thwart the  federal objective of one body of law by passing one statute, the attempt would be unconstitutional, because the supremacy clause is a constitutional command, which takes precedence over mere legislation.  The federal government is not able to give states the power to thwart otherwise clear federal objectives.

Counterarguments:

1. The heading of 8 USC 1621 (d) suggests that the state may provide any benefit to undocumented immigrants.  Headings, though, are merely guides, and cannot be used to contradict the terms of the statute.

2. The first clause of the statute seems to say, a state may provide any benefit, but, this at least creates ambiguity, because the statute says, it may grant benefits only through a  law enacted after 8/22/1996. At best, further analysis of the statutory meaning, by examining the statutory history should have been conducted.

Now that two years have passed, it would be interesting to see how many undocumented immigrants have received bar licenses.  As a self-hating attorney, I would be tempted to say, if illegals want to be miserable like the rest of us, let them.

Since my writing is probably too verbose, here's my interpretation of subsection d in a nutshell:  states may not give benefits to undocumented immigrants, except as provided by subsection b, and then only if the state writes an unambiguous law so granting such an exception, after 1998.